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• Fire can be a catastrophic hazard for the manned space flight program
• ISS and S&MA community recently counted 516 discrete flammable 
items
• Increase of 40% over 3 years
• Bungees, plastic Ziplocs, paper, and packaging
Research Motivation
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• For NASA material testing, the 
assumption has been that materials will 
burn more readily in 1-g compared to 
microgravity
• However, flame spread behavior in low-
gravity is substantially different than in 1-g
• Low-speed air flow has a major influence 
on material flammability
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NASA Standard 6001 Test 1
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• Upward flame spread test
• Failed test if sample material is consumed past 15 cm
• 1-g upward flame spread is assumed to be worst case for flammability
• Some materials have shown downward flame spread to be worse
• Other figures of merit:  MOC; ULOI
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Saffire Project
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• Spacecraft Fire Experiment
• Study microgravity flame spread
• Saffire I and III will study large sample
• Saffire II will study 9 small samples
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Saffire Operations Concept
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Silicone Samples
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• 4 of 9 small samples on Saffire II will be Silicone
• Polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS)
• C2H6OSi
• Practical applications on ISS
• Grips for spacesuit gloves
• Microprocessor covers
• Flammability limits near expected test 
atmosphere
• Obtained different burn lengths for different 
thicknesses
The maximum oxygen concentration 
and upward limiting oxygen index (in 
percent O2) for five thicknesses of 
silicone fuel [from Hirsch et al.]  The 
chemical igniter provided 3000 J in 
25 + 5 s.
Thickness
(mm)
MOC ULOI
1.0 22 23.4
0.61 20 22.8
0.36 19 21
0.25 18 19.7
0.10 17 17.5
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Test Facilities: Large Enclosure
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• Most tests conducted in material flammability test chamber
• Unsealed enclosure ~ 1 m3 in size attached to room exhaust
• Hot wire igniter
• 29 AWG KanthalTM
• 3.8 amps for 8 seconds (92 W)
Silicone sample with igniter
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Test Facilities: Forced Flow Addition
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• 5 lateral 7.5-cm diameter muffin fans
• Flow straightened by 1.5-cm thick 
honeycomb mesh
• Up to 2 m/s flow
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Test Facilities: Sealed Chamber
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• Used to vary oxygen concentration
• Gas flow (from pressurized bottles) between 0 and 30 cm/s achievable
• Chamber: 20-cm inner diameter
• Samples were 10-cm tall by 5-cm wide
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Results: Upward Spreading Buoyant Flow
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• 3 of the 4 thicknesses 
ignited
• Every thickness that 
ignited has at least 1 
sample that self-
extinguished
Thickness (mm) Burn Length* (cm) Burn Time* (s) Spread Rate* (mm/s)
0.25 27.5 52.7 5.2
0.36 14.8 51.0 2.9
0.61 7.6 60.8 1.2
1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
* Values represent the average of 6 tests for each thickness
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Results: Downward Spreading Buoyant Flow
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• 2 of the 4 thicknesses tested ignited
• Every sample that was ignited burned the full length
• Significantly slower than upward flame spread
Thickness (mm) Burn Length* (cm) Burn Time* (s) Spread Rate* (mm/s)
0.25 30.0 295.7 1.0
0.36 30.0 539.4 0.6
0.61 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
* Values represent the average of 6 tests for each thickness
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Results: Angled Spreading Buoyant Flow
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• Horizontal flame spread burned similar to 
downward flame spread
• Some angles for the 0.36-mm samples allowed 
complete burning
Angle (deg)
Burn Length (cm)
(0.36-mm thick)
Burn Length (cm)
(0.61-mm thick)
0 30.0 0.0
60 30.0 9.5
75 30.0 9.9
80 15.8 9.4
90 14.8 7.6
* Values represent the average of 6 tests for each thickness
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Results: Forced Flow
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• Forced flow enhanced flame spread
• Samples could not ignite in the downward 
configuration under forced flow
• For samples ignited downward without flow, 
the flames were blown off almost 
immediately when forced flow was applied
Thickness (mm) Burn Length (cm) Burn Time (s) Burn Velocity (mm/s)
0.36 30.0 88.6 3.4
0.61 30.0 198.9 1.5
Flame with 
forced flow
Flame without 
forced flow
* Values represent the average of 6 tests for each thickness
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Results: Upward, Downward and Forced Flow
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• 1-mm thick sample did not ignite in air
• Forced flow increased burn length and upward spread rate for 0.61, 0.36 
and 0.25-mm samples 
• Samples in upward configuration that were burning under forced flow self 
extinguished after forced flow was shut off
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Results: Maximum Oxygen Concentration
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• Oxygen concentrations from 17% to 26% were examined
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Residue Analysis: TGA 
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• Thermo-Gravimetric Analysis
• 10 C increase per minute
• Post burn analysis of 0.61-mm sample
• Mass loss in 4 different areas
• Original fuel and undamaged silica covered 
fuel produced same mass loss curve
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Residue Analysis: SEM and EDS
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• Energy Dispersive X-ray Spectroscopy (EDS) performed on the deposit 
from an upward burning 0.36-mm sample post test
• Only silicon and oxygen detected leading to assumption the deposit was 
SiO2 (silica)
• Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) image of same sample post burn
• ~ 0.3 mm of silica deposit
SEM images.  (a) SiO2 layers formed on both sides of the originally 0.36-mm-thick silicone 
sample after an upward burn.  (b) SiO2 layer 286 m thick was formed over the silicone 
sample.
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Discussion and Model
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• Flame spread model from 
Markstein and de Ris
• Critical heat flux needed to raise 
thermal inertia of half the thickness 
of a sample plus silica deposit
• Dashed line represents half 0.36-
mm sample with 286 µm of silica 
deposit
 𝑞′′ =
[(𝜌𝑠𝑐𝑝,𝑆
𝛿𝑠
2 ) + (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑂2𝑐𝑝,𝑆𝑖𝑂2𝛿𝑆𝑖𝑂2)] 𝑇𝑖𝑔𝑛 − 𝑇∞
𝜏
ρs (kg/m
3)z 970
Cp,s (J/kg-K) 1050
ρSiO2 (kg/m
3) 2600
Cp,SiO2 (J/kg-K) 1591
Tign (K) 673
T (K) 293
 (s) 55
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Analysis Conclusions
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• There is a critical heat flux needed to raise the temperature of 
silicone to the pyrolysis temperature and continue flame spread
• Silica deposits downstream onto silicone sample
• Flame uses energy to heat silica, has less energy for pyrolysis of 
sample
• Angled configuration and forced flow tests results support this 
hypothesis
• Other possible mechanisms for extinction:
• Deposit layer could be acting as a physical barrier to mass 
transfer
• Could affect flame stabilization zone or flame standoff 
distance
• Emissivity of silica layer could be higher than silicone 
producing greater heat loss
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Summary and Conclusions
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• As silicone burns upward, silica deposits downstream
• If the silicone is ignited in the downward configuration, it burns 
the entire length of the sample
• Burning upward at an angle increases the burn length in some 
cases possibly due to less silica deposition
• Forced flow in the upward burning case increases flammability, 
likely due to an increase in convective flow preventing silica 
from depositing
• Samples in upward configuration burning under forced flow 
self extinguish after forced flow is removed
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Questions
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Results: Angled Spreading Buoyant Flow
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• Horizontal flame spread 
burned similar to downward 
flame spread
• Some angles for the 0.36 
mm aloud the sample to 
burn to completion
Test Name
Thickness 
(mm)
Burn Length 
(cm)
Burn Time 
(s)
Burn Velocity 
(mm/s)
Horizontal 0.25 30.00 287.34 1.04
Horizontal 0.36 30.00 530.87 0.57
Horizontal 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00
60 degree 
upward 0.36 30.00 141.89 2.11
60 degree 
upward 0.61 9.53 93.23 1.02
75 degree 
upward 0.36 30.00 103.00 2.91
75 degree 
upward 0.61 9.86 83.00 1.19
80 degree 
upward 0.36 15.80 55.00 2.87
80 degree 
upward 0.61 9.43 72.94 1.29
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Residue Analysis: TGA 
25
• Thermogravimetric Analysis
• Post burn analysis of 0.61 mm sample
• Mass loss in 4 different areas
• Original fuel and undamaged silica 
covered fuel produced same mass loss 
curve
• 10 degrees a minute
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 200 400 600 800
%
 M
as
s 
Lo
ss
 
Temperature (˚C)
Lower Damaged
Higher Damaged
Undamaged Silica
Covered
Original Fuel
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
www.nasa.gov
Residue Analysis: TGA 
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• Thermogravimetric Analysis
• Post burn analysis of 0.61 mm sample
• Mass loss in 4 different areas
• Original fuel and undamaged silica 
covered fuel produced same mass loss 
curve
• 10 degrees a minute
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 Conduct stakeholder review of the objectives and mission concept
 March 2015
 Evaluate design concepts to define science requirements
 Interim Concept Review in November 2015
 Develop breadboards and final design
 December 2015 – September 2016 (re-use of Saffire-I, II, III)
 Manufacturing
 October 2016 – May 2017
 Assembly and Test
 June 2017 – May 2018 (staggered test of IV, V, and VI)
 Launches
 Saffire-IV:  September 2018
 Saffire-V:  March 2019
 Saffire-VI: September 2019
 Plans will be submitted in PPBE17
Saffire-IV, V, and VI Development Path
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Prioritization of Objectives
Objective
Est
Priority
Comment
Stakeholder 
Priority?
9
Post-fire monitoring: Demonstrate performance of 
prototype Orion and ISS CPM
1
Demo of prototype flight hardware; 
specified in Program Resource Guidance
5
11
Fire behavior/modeling: Quantify growth and end 
state of realistic fires in spacecraft and their 
influence on vehicle habitability
2 Require to validate model development 1
12
Fire behavior/modeling: Obtain data required to 
validate spacecraft fire scenario models
2 Required for model development 1
2
Fire growth/dynamics: Flame behavior in complex 
geometries
3 More realistic configurations 2
3
Fire growth/dynamics: Flame behavior for planar 
and complex geometries in exploration atmospheres 
4
Elevated O2, lower P; compare with Saffire-
I, II, III; supplement small-scale tests in CIR
3
1
Fire growth/dynamics: Measure flame behavior 
over planar surfaces
5 Continue Saffire-I and III 4
4
Fire detection: Obtain data to validate transport and 
detection models
6 Required for model development 5
5
Fire detection: Demonstrate fire detection with 
multi-moment sensors
6 Reject nuisance alarms 5
6
Fire detection: Evaluate performance of hybrid fire 
detection (smoke and gaseous products)
6
Combustion product detection by prototype 
CPM
5
10
Post-fire monitoring: Quantify rate of decay of gas 
species
6
Required for model development; get with 
Objective 9 but only natural decay
5
8
Post-fire cleanup: Quantify atmosphere cleanup 
rate with prototype smoke-eater
7 Demo of prototype flight hardware 6
7
Fire suppression: Performance of low-momentum 
water mist suppression
8 Effectiveness of fire ports 7
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Advanced Exploration Systems
WBS 067463 - Spacecraft Fire Safety Demonstration
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Project Mission Statement:
Develop and conduct a large-scale fire 
safety experiment on an International 
Space Station resupply vehicle after it 
leaves the ISS and before it re-enters the 
Earth’s atmosphere.
GRC Scope:
• Project leadership
• Design, fabricate, and operate the large-
scale low-gravity fire safety experiment
Project Life Cycle Schedule
GRC Project Manager: MX/Gary A. Ruff
GRC Chief Engineer:  LA/Lynn Capadona
GRC Chief Safety Officer: QER/ Bill Schoren
GRC Lead System Engineer: LSB/Karen Weiland
GRC Resource Integration: MX/Thomas Acquaviva
FY15 Budget ($K):  $7,308
FY15 FTEs/WYEs:  32.3/14.0
Phase: D (System AI&T, Launch, and Check-out)
Project start/end: 10/1/2011 – 9/30/2017
Milestones
Continuation 
Review
ATP
MCR/SRR
(Unit 1,2,3)
PTR-1
(Unit 1,2,3)
Safety f I / II
(Unit 1,2,3)
Continuation 
Review
PTR-2
(Unit 1,2,3)
Continuation 
Review
Safety f III
(Unit 1)
SAR
(Unit 1)
Actual/ Baseline 09/18/2012 10/01/2012 11/2012 7/2013 08/2013 09/2013 2/2014 9/2014 3/2015 7/2015
Milestones
Continuation 
Review
ORR
(Unit 1)
Launch
(Unit 1)
Safety f III
(Unit 2)
ORR
(Unit 2)
Launch
(Unit 2)
Safety f III
(Unit 3)
ORR
(Unit 3)
Continuation 
Review
Launch
(Unit 3)
Actual/ Baseline 9/2015 3/2016 3/2016 2/2016 6/2016 6/2016 6/2016 9/2016 9/2016 10/2016
Combustion
30
• Our primary energy source (85%)
• A catastrophic hazard for the manned space flight program
• The reality is that substantial improvements in the quality of life in space or here on 
earth will require improvements in our ability to predict and control combustion.
• High-efficiency, low-emission flames can be near limit, which are unstable, where 
kinetics are important
• Demonstration that flame spread behavior in low-gravity is substantially different from 
1-g
• Invalidation of the prevalent assumption that 1-g is always a worse case than low-g
• Demonstration of the significance of low speed air flows on material flammability.
• Materials Combustion
– Burning and Suppression of Solids (BASS), 2012, MSG
– Flammability Assessment of Materials for Exploration (FLAME), CIR
Flight results: Flame Spread 
Ignition at the middle of the sample:
•Flame spreads upstream, however, in the shape of a fan.
• With an increase in the incoming air flow velocity, the fan angle 
increases due to an increase in oxygen supply rate.
• This is completely contrary to normal gravity
• An unpredicted and presently unexplained smoldering pattern was 
observed in thin cellulose. 
The Burning and Suppression of Solids Experiment (BASS) – 2012 
in process now
ISS Results Solid Fuel Combustion-Material Flammability
BASS in MSG
Don Pettit running BASS
Spherical PMMA sample
in BASS.  N2 Jet does not 
extinguish flame, only blows 
out stagnation region. Wake 
region continues to burn.
Nomex III burning in 
BASS in air.  This 
material will not burn 
in air on earth. 
Recent Results:
With BASS we can measure material flammability in 
microgravity to compare with normal gravity flammability 
NASA-STD-6001 Test # 1.  Results to date indicate that 
Test 1 is not conservative, and materials can burn at lower 
oxygen levels in microgravity than on Earth.
BASS also assesses the effectiveness of N2 inert 
extinguishing agent in putting out flames over different 
materials, geometries, and flow.  Results to date indicate 
that local application of suppressant is not adequate to 
fully extinguish the flames.  The local jet entrains air and 
sustains the flame even when the ambient air flow is 
turned off.
N2 flow makes candle 
flame longer, it does not 
put it out.
Relevance/Impact:
Spacecraft fires are a significant risk factor for human exploration.  
Understanding material flammability and suppression in actual spacecraft 
environments relative to 1g materials screening is needed to mitigate this risk.
The PMMA material burned in BASS is being considered for MPCV windows. 
JSC was surprised that this thick sample ignited easily and burned well in air.
Ground-based drop tower testing provides some data, but long-duration microgravity 
data is needed to study flammability limits for all but the thinnest films.
Image analysis
ISS Resource Requirements
Flammability Assessment of Materials for 
Exploration (FLAME)
Objective:
 To study and characterize ignition and flammability of solid spacecraft materials 
in practical geometries and realistic atmospheric conditions
Relevance/Impact:
 Improve EVA suit design
 Determine safer selection of cabin materials and validate NASA materials 
flammability selection 1-g test protocols for low-gravity fires
 Improve understanding of early fire growth behavior
 Validate material flammability numerical models
 Determine optimal suppression techniques for burning materials by diluents, flow 
reduction, and venting
Development Approach:
 Develop FLAME facility (CIR insert and avionics) to support  multiple solid-
material combustion and  fire suppression studies
 Utilize Combustion Integrated Rack (CIR) 
 Support multiple investigations using common infrastructure:
 Common interfaces and flow control
 Removable test sections and sample holders
 Removable ignition system
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CIR Facility on ISS
CIR Insert – FLEX
(Similar to anticipated 
FLAME insert)
Flat, Spherical, and 
Cylindrical samples (L to R) 
burning in 1-g
FLAME PI’s:
Subrata Bhattacharjee, San Diego State University 
Sandra Olson, NASA Glenn Research Center 
James T’ien, Case Western Reserve University 
Carlos Fernandez-Pello, University of California, Berkeley 
Fletcher Miller, San Diego State University
PS: Paul Ferkul, NCSER
PM: Mark Hickman, GRC
Engineering Team: GRC in-house team
Accommodation (carrier) CIR
Upmass (kg)
(w/o packing factor)
250 kg
Volume (m3)
(w/o packing factor)
0.50 m3
Power (kW)
(peak)
0.75 kW
Crew Time (hrs) Crew 
Time (hrs)
- Initial configuration of CIR Rack
- Change-outs during experiment
8 hrs
8 hrs
Autonomous Ops (hrs) 200 hrs
Launch/Increment Inc. 55
Project Life Cycle Schedule
Milestone
s
Kickoff SCR RDR PDR CDR VRR Safety SAR Ship Launch Ops Ops End Report
Baseline Oct 2012 May 
2013
May 
2014
Jun 2015 Sep 2016 Sep 2017 Dec 2017 Mar 2018 Apr 2018 Jul 2018 Aug 2018 Nov 2019 Dec 2020
Revision Date:  3/27/12
Spacecraft Fire Safety Demonstration Flight
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Most U.S. agencies responsible for large 
transportation systems conduct full-scale fire 
tests to  address gaps in fire safety knowledge 
and prove equipment and protocols.
Objective:
• Advance spacecraft fire safety technologies 
identified as gaps by the Constellation Program 
and in the Exploration Technology Roadmaps
• Demonstrate their performance in a large-scale, 
low-gravity spacecraft fire safety test aboard an
unmanned re-entry vehicle 
– Demonstration of the operational concept 
could allow future experiments to investigate 
fire detection and suppression equipment 
and protocols.
FAA full scale aircraft test
Naval Research Laboratory
Ex-USS Shadwell
ESA  ATV approaching the 
ISS
Cut-away of the 
Automated Transport 
Vehicle (ATV). The 
large-scale experiment 
could be conducted in 
one of the standard 
payload racks.
Relevance to Human Space Flight:
The material flammability questions to be 
addressed in this experiment were identified 
during the design of  the ECLS system for Orion, 
Altair, and Lunar Surface Systems
• Addresses knowledge gaps that must be 
resolved for assured protection of a 
spacecraft from fire hazards
Saffire Overview
Needs:
 Low-g flammability limits for spacecraft 
materials
 Definition of realistic fires for exploration 
vehicles
‒ Fate of a large-scale spacecraft fire
Objectives:
 Saffire-I: Assess flame spread of large-
scale microgravity fire (spread 
rate, mass consumption, heat 
release)
 Saffire-II: Verify oxygen flammability limits 
in low gravity
 Saffire-III: Same as Saffire-I but at different 
flow conditions.
• Data obtained from the experiment will be used to 
validate modeling of spacecraft fire response 
scenarios
• Evaluate NASA’s normal-gravity material 
flammability screening test for low-gravity conditions.
Fans
Power
Management
Cameras
Signal
conditioning
card
Sample card
(flame spread
sample shown)
Flow
straightener
Flow DuctAvionics Bay
Saffire module consists of a flow duct 
containing the sample card and an avionics 
bay. All power, computer, and data acquisition 
modules are contained in the bay. Dimensions 
are approximately 53- by 90- by 133-cm
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Cygnus 
approaching 
ISS
Check-out SFS Demo experiment
Unpack cargo, reload with trash
Proposed location of the SFS 
Demo experiment (back of vehicle)
SFSD Concept
Issues
Trash packing
 Based on input from Orbital, we anticipated that Cygnus packing for re-
entry would be similar to launch
 Developed a Payload Integration Agreement to prevent stowage near the 
Saffire inlet and outlet
37
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Issues
Trash packing
38
 Actual trash packing is not quite so organized
 Impacts air mixing and oxygen availability for Saffire
Orb-2 Trash Packing
 Project has discussed this with Orbital and 
begun discussions with our Payload 
Integration Manager with ISS
Silicone Samples
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• 4 of 9 small samples on Saffire
will be Silicone
• Silicone is a very simple option for burning on the second flight of the Saffire
project. It has practical application in space such as covering for camera 
microprocessors and for grips for space suit gloves. The silicone samples that 
are being proposed are readily available in various thicknesses which will 
make it easy to test thickness effects on flammability in microgravity. It has 
been studied extensively on the ground, with a thickness that is right on the 
border of passing NASA Standard 6001 Test 1 (self-extinguish before 6 
inches)[1]. It is solid and non-porous, giving it great structural integrity. The 
MSDS and material properties are readily available and understood.
• Silicone has been tested in a 1-G environment using the NASA STD-6001 
Test #1 experiment. Five thicknesses have been testing and three thicknesses 
are close to the limit. The .04’’ thickness does not ignite, while the .024’’ and 
.014’’ on average pass Test 1. .01’’ and .004’’ thicknesses do not pass Test 1 
in any of the trials. Figure 1 demonstrates an “S” curve, which gives the 
probability of a sample to pass Test 1 against a certain variable.  Tables 1 
through 4 show the specific results below.
• If the Silicone, especially the .014’’ thickness, burns greater length in 
microgravity, it could prove that Test 1 is not a conservative test and needs to 
be re-evaluated. The MOC for the same thicknesses of silicon has been tested 
by Hirsch [2]. It would be interesting from a scientific point of view to see if 
the MOC changes once in microgravity. The .014’’ thick Silicone sample also 
burns downward without self-extinguishment, showing it could possibly be 
more flammable in microgravity than 1-G. 
• The purpose of the experiment will be to test silicone thicknesses that are 
near the limit of passing NASA STD-6001 Test 1 in air at 1-G. Then by 
picking a thickness above the flammability limit and below the flammability 
limit, the effect of 0-G on thickness of material can be determined. The length 
of the burn, and whether the material passes Test 1 can be compared for 1-G 
vs. 0-G, along with the burn rate. The proposal is to burn a sample of the 
.024’’, .14’’ and .01’’ thicknesses of the silicone samples.
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• 4 of 9 small samples on Saffire
will be Silicone
• An effort to determine the thinnest sample that can pass Test 1 has been 
complete and the data is shown below. Testing that thickness and others near 
the limit will help determine the conservatism of Test 1 in microgravity. The 
samples take approximately 1 minute to burn in 1-G so microgravity results 
using drop towers and parabolic flights would not be an option. MOC and 
ULOI data for these samples exist, which can be compared to the results 
obtained in microgravity.
• The samples to be tested are thermally thin, meaning the thickness of the 
material determines its flammability. The silicone samples are simple in 
nature, making it easy to find their thermophysical properties, and the MSDS 
from the supplier is readily available.
• The stakeholders for this experiment are the scientific community that 
researches combustion and flammability, along with the spacecraft engineers 
who determine which materials are safe for microgravity. This experiment 
can satisfy both types of stakeholders by comparing ground data to 
microgravity data, and by testing the conservatism of tests used to select 
spacecraft materials.
